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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-PATENTS, TRADEMARKS
AND COPYRIGHTS
MICHAEL D. McCoY*
The ten decisions by the Seventh Circuit in the intellectual
property field during the 1980-81 term did not mark any significant
departures from previous decisions, although the court did hold that a
district court does not have the authority to compel a patentee to seek a
reissue patent prior to a judicial determination. The cases covered di-
verse topics. Only two cases involved the more traditional issues of
patent validity or infringement. The remaining patent cases related to
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, licensee validity challenges and
post-challenge royalties, the resjudicata effect of consent decrees, attor-
ney's fees, and the dischargeability in bankruptcy of patent infringe-
ment. A copyright case dealt with forfeiture under the 1909 Act, and a
trademark case dealt with the descriptiveness of a service mark.
PATENTS
Validity & Infringement
Saunders v. Air-Flo Co.
Saunders v. Air-Flo Co.' involved two patents issued to Saunders
for a baffle to reduce wind resistance in tractor-trailer trucks and single
chassis trucks.2 The patented baffle is mounted on top of the cab of the
tractor or truck and diverts air flow away from the front of the trailer or
van so that it will reattach smoothly to the sides of the trailer or van.
Thus, air drag is reduced, increasing fuel efficiency.
The northern district court of Indiana3 invalidated the patents as
anticipated under section 102(a)4 and obvious under section 1035 of ti-
tle 35 of the United States Code. The Seventh Circuit reversed, hold-
* Partner, Neuman, Williams, Anderson & Olson, Chicago, Illinois. B.S., University of
Illinois; J.D., IIT/Chicago Kent College of Law.
1. 646 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1981) (Fairchild, J., with Castle & Swygert, JJ.).
2. United States Patent No. 3,241,876, entitled "Apparatus for Reducing Linear and Lateral
Wind Resistance in a Tractor-Trailer Combination Vehicle," 824 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 1432
(1966); United States Patent No. 3,309,131, entitled "Means for Reducing Linear Wind Resistance
in Single Chassis Type Vehicles," 836 OFFICIAL GAz. PAT. OFF. 613 (1967).
3. Saunders v. Air-Flo Co., 435 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (Sharp, J.).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) provides in part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or de-
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ing the two patents valid and remanded for further proceedings on the
issue of infringement.
With respect to the issue of obviousness, the Seventh Circuit ac-
knowledged the tripartite factual test enunciated in Graham v. John
Deere Co.6 and addressed each part, including secondary considera-
tions. Structural differences between the patented baffle and existing
fairings, deflectors, barriers and conduits were noted and discussed, but
the court's primary focus was on the functional differences between the
prior art and the claimed invention. In so doing, the Seventh Circuit
confirmed its earlier rulings that combination patents are not required
to exhibit synergism. 7
Although the district court did not specify what it considered to be
the pertinent art or the level of ordinary skill in the art, the Seventh
Circuit stated:
We view the pertinent art as the design of trucks and trailers and the
level of ordinary skill as that of an educated engineer with experience
in such design, although not an expert in aerodynamics.
We are to consider whether the Saunders solution would have
been obvious to a hypothetical person addressing the same problem,
scribed in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent, ....
Henceforth, all statutory citations are to title 35 of the United States Code unless otherwise
indicated.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
6. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). In Graham, the Supreme Court stated:
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law .... the § 103 condi-
tion, which is but one of three conditions, each of which must be satisfied, lends itself to
several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to
be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascer-
tained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this back-
ground, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of
others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of
the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness,
these inquiries may have relevancy.
Id. at 17-18 (citation omitted).
7. 646 F.2d at 1208, (citing Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 969 (7th
Cir. 1979)). See also Dual Mfg. & Eng'r, Inc. v. Burris Indus., 619 F.2d 660, 662 n.3 (7th Cir.
1980) ("This court... made it clear that synergism is not the ine qua non of patentability but
rather that the analysis of Graham . Jo/n Deere Co., will be the exclusive means by which
to measure nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.").
"Synergism" refers to the combined actions of two or more agents that produces a greater
effect than that of the sum of each action considered separately. See Crossan, Patent Law: Syner-
gian Rejected, 56 Cm. KENT L. Rv. 339 n.3 (1980).
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possessing that degree of skill, and having all the prior art at hand.8
The Seventh Circuit viewed the scope and content of the prior art as
follows: a) that streamlining a truck to minimize air resistance would
lower drag and improve fuel efficiency; b) that connecting a full fairing
from a tractor to a trailer would accomplish streamlining but was im-
practical because it prevented the tractor from turning independently
of the trailer (disclosed in University of Maryland studies); c) that a
barrier would create a low pressure area behind it and prevent the pas-
sage of air; d) that a baffle, such as a bug deflector, would cause air to
separate or deflect from a surface and might increase air drag; and e)
that a conduit could be constructed on top of a tractor to divert the air
flow away from the face of a trailer by channeling the air flow (dis-
closed in Stammr United States Patent No. 2,863,695). 9 The court also
observed that streamlining, fairings and conduits had been used with
trucks, that baffles had been used on automobiles and that all of these
were used to alter air flow.10
The Seventh Circuit next discussed the differences between the
prior art and the claims of the patent. After carefully considering the
functional aspects of the prior art,I' the court expressly rejected the dis-
trict court's use of "fairing" and "deflector" as interchangeable terms,' 2
and Air-Flo's contention that "baffle" was equally interchangeable.' 3
Instead, dictionary definitions and expert testimony were relied upon to
establish that a fairing was a streamlining device that created a new
surface for air flow, while a deflector detached air flow and directed it
outward.' 4 The court noted that Saunder's baffle differed functionally
from the prior art because it obstructed air flow. And, although baffles
also deflect air flow, the court concluded that "there are very significant
differences in many respects, such as abruptness, turbulence, and re-
sulting low pressure area."' 5
In addition to functional differences, the court of appeals ex-
amined claimed structural differences between the patented baffle and
8. 646 F.2d at 1207 (footnote and citation omitted).
9. Id. at 1204, 1206-07. See 737 OmcLAI, GAz. PAT. OFF. 409 (1958).
10. Id. at 1207.
11. Although the court relied upon functional features to distinguish the prior art from the
claimed invention, it abandoned functional features in determining infringement. See text accom-
panying notes 23-26 infra.
12. 646 F.2d at 1206.
13. Id. at 1206 n.8.
14. Id. at 1205-06. See also id at 1204 n.7, where the court defined "fairing" as "a smooth
contoured surface designed to provide streamlining by keeping air flow attached to its surface
from the tractor roof to the trailer roof." Id.
15. Id. at 1206.
.481
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the prior art, notably a specified range of height and position. These
differences were utilized to distinguish Saunder's baffle from 1) con-
duits, which channeled air flow; 2) automobile bug deflector baffles,
which were much shorter in relation to the windshield downstream;
and 3) barriers, which were at least as high as the obstruction
downstream. 16
Thus, the Seventh Circuit relied on both functional and structural
differences to support its finding of nonobviousness. The court con-
cluded by stating:
The University of Maryland [streamlining] and Stamm [conduit]
devices differed from Saunders in that they are not baffles. Whether
or not the bug deflectors reduced air drag of an automobile, they
were designed for other objectives. Although the known principles
referred to are consistent with the reduction of air drag produced by
Saunders, there is no evidence that anyone previously sought to re-
duce the air drag of a tractor-trailer combination by placing a baffle
atop a tractor cab, or any equivalent arrangement. 7
With respect to relevant secondary indicia of nonobviousness, the
district court found that "any commercial success achieved by [plain-
tiff] was the result of sales promotion and of outside factors. . ." and
thus, discounted it.18 The Seventh Circuit did not disturb this finding.
In discussing the failure of others to solve the same problem, the
Seventh Circuit noted that others who presumably possessed "a sub-
stantial degree of pertinent skill" addressed the problem but did not
come up with a solution.' 9 Specifically, the court relied on 1) the Uni-
versity of Maryland studies where no attempt was made to test a baffle,
2) the absence of the disclosure of a baffle in any of the prior art patents
that addressed the problem and 3) expert testimony indicating that the
patentee had utilized "'a turbulent, high drag device [to] end up with a
net savings.' ",20
The Seventh Circuit held the trial court's finding of anticipation
erroneous because the trial court considered only the similar air deflect-
ing function of the prior art without regard to differences in structure or
operation. As the Seventh Circuit noted, functionality is only a portion
of the correct test: "A previous patent. . . anticipates a purported in-
vention only where, except for insubstantial differences, it contains all
of the same elements operating in the same fashion to perform an iden-
16. Id. at 1206-07.
17. Id. at 1207.
18. Id. at 1208.
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting the expert).
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tical function. '21 Relying on the substantial differences in elements,
operation and function that were noted in its discussion of the obvi-
ousness issue, the Seventh Circuit overturned the trial court's finding of
anticipation.22
Remanding for further proceedings on infringement, the Seventh
Circuit held one finding of the trial court clearly erroneous and af-
firmed another, but appears to have been inconsistent in doing so.
Claims 1 and 2 recite a baffle "forwardly convexed in a horizontal
plane." The accused device, similar to a V-shaped snow plow, has con-
cave side portions, but when "[c]onsidered as a unit" the point is for-
ward of the two ends.23 Thus, the court of appeals determined that the
district court erred in considering only discrete portions of the accused
device. However, whether this broad standard was applied to a second
limitation is open to question.
Claims 3 and 4 recite, in combination with a tractor-trailer vehicle,
a baffle "having its lower edge in substantially air impervious relation
therewith, for diverting the substantially entire air flow relatively
widely in a manner to avoid entry of the air stream into the gap
. . .."24 Plaintiff's expert testified to his understanding of "air imper-
vious" as follows:
It means that the surface--the bottom is not truly--truly at-
tached or absolutely impervious like exactly matched to the top of
the cab of the truck.
But it means that as far as the air is concerned, there is little air
flow, or maybe no air flow through there, that it just acts impervious
to the air.25
In addition, test results showed that a small gap did not affect the plain-
tiff's device or change the pattern of air flow. Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit did not disturb the district court's finding that the accused de-
vice was not mounted in a substantially air impervious relation:
Given the ordinary meaning of 'impervious,' the lack of any in-
sight provided in the patent into the concept of 'substantially air im-
pervious relation,' and given the Smith [expert] testimony, we think
the district court did not err in finding that the Air-Flo shield was not
mounted in a substantially air impervious relation to the tractor roof.
21. Id at 1203 (citing Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 494 F.2d 162, 164 (7th Cir.
1974)). Accord, Reynolds Metals Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 609 F.2d 1218, 1220 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 989 (1980); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Sweetheart Plastics, Inc., 436
F.2d 1180, 1182-83 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 403 U.S. 942 (1971).
22. 646 F.2d at 1203.
23. Id. at 1209.
24. Id. at 1202 n.5.
25. Id. at 1209.
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Accordingly, Air-Flo did not infringe claims 3 and 4 of '876.26
In so holding, the Seventh Circuit appears to have ignored the require-
ment in the patent that the baffle be in combination with the tractor
roof and the fact that the word "substantially" precedes the word "im-
pervious." Moreover, the court also ignored the phrase in the claim
that immediately follows the "air impervious" recitation which pro-
vides the "insight" that the court stated was missing: "for diverting the
substantially entire air flow ....
Nonobviousness
Sauer Machine Co. v. Corrugated Finishing Products, Inc.
Nonobviousness, one of the prerequisites to obtaining a patent
under section 103,28 is one of the most litigated issues in patent law. In
Sauer Machine Co. v. Corrugated Finishing Products, Inc. ,29 the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed a district court finding of obviousness and .held
that a combination patent for an anvil cover was nonobvious and
valid. 30 The Seventh Circuit found that the district court erred because
it "did not give sufficient weight to the innovation achieved in Sauer's
new design." 31
Corrugated cardboard is cut by a rotating wheel with knife-like
dies on the edges that cut against a rotating cylindrical anvil. The anvil
is covered with a rubbery polyurethane strip that fits around it like a
sleeve. In an effort to minimize wear of the anvil cover, it axially
freewheels around the circumference of the anvil so that the dies will
strike it at random locations, thus evenly distributing the wear.32
One prior art design for an anvil cover was disclosed in an earlier
patent to Sauer, the same inventor of the patent in suit.3 3 It involved
cover halves with T-shaped ribs that extended radially inwardly and fit
into complementary circumferential T-shaped slots in the anvil. The
mating edges of each cover half fit flush against each other but were not
26. Id at 1210.
27. See id at 1202 n.5.
28. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). For the statute's text, see note 5 supra.
29. 642 F.2d 203 (7th Cit. 1981) (Wisdom, J., sitting by designation from the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, with Bauer & Cudahy, JJ.).
30. United States Patent No. 3,522,754, entitled "Reinforced Freewheeling Resilient Cover
For Rotary Die-Cutting AnviL" 877 OmcFF ,. GAZ. PAT. OFF. 103 (1970).
31. 642 F.2d at 206.
32. Id. at 204-05.
33. United States Patent No. 3,274,873, entitled "Rotary Anvil Construction." 830 OMcIAL
GAZ. PAT. OFF. 1412 (1966). The opinion erroneously cites United States Patent No. 3,724,873,
entitled "Three-Wheeled Vehicle." 909 OmciAL GAz. PAT. OFF. 230 (1973). See 642 F.2d at
205.
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connected or locked together. In use, this prior art cover would warp
and bow, causing the T-shaped rib to disalign and jam in the mating
slot, preventing freewheeling.34
The solution to the foregoing problem was the configuration of the
patent in suit. It disclosed and claimed the substitution of a rib
designed to fit into a U-shaped slot, i e., a "T" without the upper arms,
and the addition of "interlocking" means between the mating edges of
each half of the cover.35
In overturning the district court's finding that the patent was obvi-
ous under section 103,36 the Seventh Circuit distinguished other patents
using ribs for freewheeling anvils because they did not disclose any
particular technique for freewheeling, and they did not solve the warp-
ing and jamming problems:
The French patent teaches the feasibility and desirability of a free-
wheeling anvil cover, as opposed to one fixed to the anvil, but it does
not purport to patent any particular technique for permitting free-
wheeling. The design example in the French patent features a dove-
tail rib-and-slot method similar in principle and operation to the T-
rib design. Both teach the use of a rib of arbitrary shape to preserve
lateral and radial stability while allowing circumferential motion;
neither solves the warping and jamming problem inherent in the ar-
bitrary rib technique.37
Sauer's patent was found to be an "innovation" because it separated
the functions of the rib:38
The innovation of the new Sauer patent is to split the rib's two func-
tions--that is, to use the rib and slot only to keep the anvil cover
from slipping off sideways (lateral stability), and to rely instead on a
new feature (joined ends) to prevent the cover from flying outward
(radial stability). The new design thus eliminates the key feature of
the old designs--the arbitrary-shaped rib-because it (sic) jams after
short use.
39
The Seventh Circuit did not state whether a cover having inter-
locking ends alone was obvious. But, it did hold that Sauer's combina-
tion of the U-shaped rib with joined ends resulted in a patentable
combination, notwithstanding the separate prior art disclosures of the
34. 642 F.2d at 205.
35. Id
36. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). For the statute's text, see note 5 supra.
37. 642 F.2d at 206. It is unclear whether the court meant that the French patent did not
claim any particular technique or did not disclose any particular technique. Based upon the
court's description of the "features" of the French patent, it is believed the court considers the
entire French disclosure, rather than just the claims, to be within the pertinent prior art. This
construction would be in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1976).
38. 642 F.2d at 206.
39. Id.
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individual elements of the claimed invention:4o
Here, the main focus of the patent at issue is on a new technique for
freewheeling: the combination of a U-shaped rib with joinder of the
cover ends. The particular type of end joint is unimportant; any con-
nection will serve the purpose so long as it holds together adequately.
The inventor, after stating the need for some kind of end joint, went
further and described a particular one. Supposing that the described
joint is obvious, however, it does not taint the patentability of the
concept of U-rib-plus-]oined-ends as a freewheeling technique. The
speccation of a lug-and-recess joint is, at worst, surplus detail, in
the same way that it would be surplus detail to stipulate that the new
anvil cover should be red.41
The Seventh Circuit further stated, in support of its holding, that an
invention is not always an "astonishing breakthrough," that the im-
provement may include "nothing new," and that "nearly every inven-
tion can be reduced to a combination or packet of old, known
things."42
In support of its finding of nonobviousness, the Seventh Circuit
also noted the huge commercial success of the Sauer patent, which
spoke with "force" in this instance.43 The new design brought about a
tenfold improvement in cover life, reduced down time to replace the
covers rapidly displaced prior art covers and was not adopted by others
until it was disclosed by Sauer."
Lack of Authority of a District Court to Compel a Patentee to Seek a
Reissue Patent
Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Erickson & Co.
Through the 1977 amendments to the reissue procedure, a paten-
tee is permitted to apply for a reissue of his patent when he becomes
aware of prior art or other information relevant to patentability that
was not previously considered by the Patent and Trademark Office. 45
The Seventh Circuit held in Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Erickson &
Co.46 that a district court did not have the power to compel a patentee
40, Claims 4-12 of the patent in suit recite the combination of a rib and interlocking lugs, but
none of them specifies the configuration of the rib. Claims 1-3 include recitations of a reinforcing
means that was not referred to by the Seventh Circuit. They do not recite the combination of a rib
and interlocking lugs. Id at 205 n.l.
41. 642 F.2d at 207 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 206 & n.2.
43. Id. at 206, 207. Although the Seventh Circuit referred to the commercial success of the
Sauer "patent," the facts cited to support its commercial success finding relate to the advantages of
the device disclosed in the patent.
44. Id. at 208.
45. See 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5594-95 (1977), codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.175 (1981).
46. 627 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1980) (Sprecher, J., with Bauer & East, JJ.).
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that is a party in a pending infringement action to apply for a reissue
patent as a condition precedent to the adjudication of the pending ac-
tion. The court stated that these amendments were for the sole benefit
of the patentee, 47 and thereby reversed the district court's decision.
Johnson & Johnson brought an infringement action against Erick-
son on a patent relating to a two-paste composite dental restorative sys-
tem to fill cavities in teeth.48 Erickson denied infringement and alleged
invalidity on numerous grounds, including undisclosed prior art and
inequitable conduct in the Patent and Trademark Office. Erickson
sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity and noninfringement. Af-
ter some discovery, Erickson moved to compel Johnson & Johnson to
apply for a reissue and the district court granted the motion. 49
The Seventh Ciriit first acknowledged that several district courts
had compelled reissuI proceedings5 o while other courts had denied mo-
tions to initiate nonvoluntary reissue proceedings.51 The court then re-
counted some basic precepts concerning patents and the courts: that
the seventeen year right to exclude others from making, using or selling
the invention is "a right and not a matter of grace or favor;"' 52 that a
patent is a property right53 of which the patentee cannot be deprived
without due process of law;54 that Congress has declared that a "'pat-
ent shall be presumed valid;' "55 and that "Congress has vested original
and exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions relating to patents in the dis-
trict courts."' 56 The court continued, "Consequently, '[t]he only author-
ity competent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any
reason whatever, is vested in the Courts of the United States and not in
47. Id. at 60.
48. United States Patent No. 3,926,906. 941 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 1358 (1975).
49. 627 F.2d at 58-59.
50. See, e.g., Sheller Globe Corp. v. Mobay Chemical Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. 1052 (E.D. Mich.
1980); Coe Laboratories, Inc. v. St. Charles Mfg. Corp., 206 U.S.P.Q. 1014 (N.D. II. 1980);
Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 206 U.S.P.Q. 1012 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Choat v. Rome
Indus., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Ga. 1979); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation,
448 P.T.C.J. 7 (S.D. Fla. 1979); K-Jack Eng'r Co. v. Pete's Newsrack, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 696 (C.D.
Cal. 1978); Lee-Boy Mfg. Co. v. Puckett, 202 U.S.P.Q. 573 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
51. See, e.g., Cooper Indus. Inc. v. J&J Fabrics, Inc., 531 P.T.C.J. A-12 (S.D. Ga. 1981);
Milliken Research Corp. v. Dan River, Inc., 206 U.S.P.Q. 1028 (W.D. Va. 1980); Goodwall Con-
str., Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. and TeL Co., 503 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Ga. 1980); RCA Corp. v.
Applied Digital Data Systems, 467 F. Supp. 99 (D. Del. 1979); Bielomatik Leuze & Co. v. South-
west Tablet Mfg. Co., 204 U.S.P.Q. 226 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Antonious v. Kamata-Ri & Co., 204
U.S.P.Q. 294 (D. Md. 1979); E.C.H. Will v. Freundlich-Gomez Mach. Corp., 201 U.S.P.Q. 476
(S.D. N.Y. 1978).
52. 627 F.2d at 59 (citing James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881)).
53. 627 F.2d at 59 (citing Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876)).
54. 627 F.2d at 59.
55. Id (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976)).
56. 627 F.2d at 59 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1976)).
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the department which issued the patent.' ",57 Turning its attention to
the reissue procedure, the Seventh Circuit noted that the provisions re-
lating to original patent applications are generally applicable to appli-
cations for a reissue of a patent. 58 Further noting that the application
for a patent is made by the inventor,59 the court concluded that the
reissue system is "initiated by the patentee and is primarily for the pat-
entee's benefit."'60
The Seventh Circuit apparently holds a dim view of reissue pro-
ceedings as a means of expediting patent litigation. Based upon its re-
view of the case law, the court stated that "reissue proceedings
frequently cause major delays in the ultimate disposition of validity
challenges."'6' The court referred to two cases where the district court
held the patents invalid despite prior reissue proceedings upholding the
validity of the patents.62 The Seventh Circuit stated that "compelled
reissue proceedings would have no effect whatever on the judicial pro-
cess."' 63 It observed that "[tjo say that the reissue process would
'strengthen' the rebuttal [sic] presumption of validity is to say nothing"
and described the seeking of a reissue as "time consuming and often
futile." 64 Thus, one challenging the validity of a patent in the Seventh
Circuit is well advised to proceed cautiously when seeking to initiate
reissue or reexamination proceedings. 65
57. 627 F.2d at 59 (citing McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609
(1898)). Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1976) (Commissioner's power to correct defectively issued patent);
id § 254 (Commissioner's power to issue certificate of correction regarding Patent Office mistake);
id § 255 (Commissioner's power to issue certificate of correction regarding an applicant's
mistake).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1976) provides in part:
The provisions of this title relating to applications for patent shall be applicable to
applications for reissue of a patent, except that application for reissue may be made and
sworn to by the assignee of the entire interest if the application does not seek to enlarge
the scope of the claims of the original patent.
No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the claims of the original
patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the original patent.
59. 35 U.S.C. § Ill (1976).
60. 627 F.2d at 59.
61. Id. at 61.
62. See Pic Inc. v. Prescon Corp., 485 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Del. 1980); Komline-Sanderson
Eng'r Corp. v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 485 F. Supp. 973 (D. Del. 1980). In both cases, the district
court stayed judicial proceedings pending the outcome of the reissue proceedings. The Seventh
Circuit offered no comment on the desirability of reissue proceedings occurring simultaneously
with discovery.
63. 627 F.2d at 62.
64. Id. at 61, 62.
65. Whether or not this attitude will extend to the new reexamination procedures which came
into effect on July 1, 1981 remains to be seen. See Adamo, Patent Reexamination, 58 CH. KENT
L. REv. 59 (1981).
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction
International Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co.
In International Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co. ,66 the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that International Harvester lacked the requisite subject mat-
ter jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment and dismissed the complaint
without prejudice. In so doing, it vacated the district court's grant of
summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of International Har-
vester.67 The Seventh Circuit discussed three separate bases for its de-
cision and indicated that each of the three provided an alternate basis
for denying jurisdiction. First, International Harvester failed to estab-
lish that Deere instilled in it a reasonable apprehension of an infringe-
ment suit. Second, International Harvester's preparations to
manufacture the potentially infringing product had not proceeded to
the point where designs were final and commercial manufacture wasimminent. And, finally, declaratory judgment would not be appropri-
ate due to the ongoing litigation between the same parties involving the
validity of the same patent.68
In 1978, Deere had obtained an order enjoining International Har-
vester from infringing United States Patent No. 3,589,110 with the 800
series corn head.69 In April 1979, during the appeal of the order, Inter-
national Harvester voluntarily submitted to Deere a partial drawing of
its CX-41 corn head and requested confirmation that it did not infringe
Deere's patent. International Harvester stated that failure to take a po-
sition or a conclusion of infringement would result in legal action.
Deere responded: "While a discussion of possible alternative designs
would undoubtedly be appropriate in the context of an overall settle-
ment of the dispute between us, we are not prepared to deal with this
issue separately. ' 70 On May 8, 1979, according to International Har-
vester's allegations, Deere advised International Harvester it would
permit production of the CX-41 for money payments. This communi-
66. 623 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980) (Sprecher, J. with Cummings, J. Cudahy, J. concurring in a
separate opinion).
67. 478 F. Supp. 411 (C.D. 11. 1979) (Morgan, J.).
68. 623 F.2d at 1215, 1217.
69. Id at 1213 n.3. In Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 460 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Inl.
1978), the district court found Deere's same patent, No. 3,589,110, entitled "Gear Drive and Sup-
port for Corn-Harvesting Unit," 887 Official Gaz. Pat. Off. 1894 (1971), valid and infringed by
International Harvester's 800 series corn head. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed that judg-
ment and remanded for further proceedings because of the district court's erroneously formulated
conclusion that the patent was valid. No. 78-2660 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, 1980) (unpublished
memorandum).
70. 623 F.2d at 1212.
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cation was denied by Deere.7' Subsequently, International Harvester
filed a declaratory judgment complaint. 72
The Declaratory Judgment Act73 provides for judgment in cases of
"actual controversy. ' 74 The plaintiff has the burden of supporting the
requisite jurisdictional allegations by competent proof based upon the
state of affairs at the time of filing the complaint.75 In declaratory judg-
ment actions involving patents, the Seventh Circuit noted that there are
two requirements for establishing an actual controversy:
First, the defendant must have engaged in conduct giving rise to a
reasonable apprehension on plaintiff's part that it will face an in-
fringement suit or the threat of one if it commences or continues the
activity in question . . . . Second, the plaintiff must have actually
produced the accused article or have engaged in preparations for
production such that
but for a finding that the product infringes or for extraordinary
and unforeseen contingencies, the plaintiff would and could be-
gin production immediately.76
The Seventh Circuit agreed with International Harvester that the
determination of whether a "reasonable apprehension" exists is gov-
erned by liberal standards.77 Thus, an explicit charge of infringement
need not be shown:
A plaintiff's reasonable apprehension may be the product of an im-
plied charge of infringement or of a course of conduct which would
lead a reasonable man to fear that he or his customers face suit or the
threat of suit. . . This reasonable apprehension, however, must be
the product of defendant's statements or conduct; a reasonable appre-
hension alone, if not inspired by defendant's actions, does not give
rise to an actual controversy.78
To establish reasonable apprehension, International Harvester relied
upon Deere's pending suit on the same patent, Deere's response to In-
71. Id.
72. Id at 1215.
73. Declaratory Judgment Act, ch. 646,62 Stat. 964 (1948), as amended (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (1976)).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,... any court of the United States,
upon the' filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal rela-
tions of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment
or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
75. 623 F.2d at 1210 (citing Grafon Corp. v. Hausermann, 602 F.2d 781, 783 (7th Cir. 1979);
Super Prods. Corp. v. DP Way Corp., 546 F.2d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 1976)). See also American
Needle & Novelty Co. v. Schuessler Knitting Mills, 379 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1967).
76. 623 F.2d at 1210-11 (citing Grafon Corp. v. Hausermann, 602 F.2d 781, 783-84 (7th Cir.
1979); Super Prods. Corp. v. DP Way Corp., 546 F.2d 748, 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1976); Sweetheart
Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 439 F.2d 871, 875 (1st Cir. 1971)).
77. 623 F.2d at 1211.
78. Id. (emphasis by the court, citations omitted).
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ternational Harvester's April 1979 letter and Deere's alleged statement
that it would allow production of the CX-41 for the payment of
money.79 However, International Harvester did not contend that its
ability to sell the CX-41 had been adversely affected by Deere. Also,
International Harvester's complaint did not allege that Deere had
made an explicit charge of infringement, nor did it allege a reasonable
apprehension of an infringement suit.8 0
The Seventh Circuit concluded that International Harvester had
not established by its allegations a reasonable apprehension of an in-
fringement suit. The ongoing litigation was deemed to be of some rele-
vance because it established that Deere would pursue patent
infringement. But, this did not indicate that Deere "would pursue a
patent suit with respect to the CX-41, or that Deere had formed any
opinion as to whether the CX-41 infringed its patent."8'
International Harvester relied heavily upon Broadview Chemical
Corp. v. Locite Corp.82 to assert an actual controversy, but the Seventh
Circuit distinguished the case. In Broadview, a prior patent suit had
been resolved and an injunction had issued, while in Deere the prior
suit was still pending and the injunction had been stayed. The Seventh
Circuit also noted that Loctite had sent letters to Broadview's custom-
ers advising them of the suit and threatening to sue any infringers,
while in the present suit Deere had not contacted any customers and
International Harvester had not alleged that its ability to sell the CX-41
had been adversely affected by Deere.8 3
Regarding International Harvester's April 1979 letter requesting
confirmation of noninfringement, the Seventh Circuit stated that it was
"of little, if any, significance" and could not have created a reasonable
apprehension of an infringement suit on International Harvester's
79. See id at 1212.
80. Id at 1211 & n.2. In its complaint International Harvester did not allege a reasonable
apprehension; instead it alleged certain facts and concluded that there was a justiciable contro-
versy. The Seventh Circuit adopted that portion of Pittway Corp. v. BRK Shareholders' Comm.,
444 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 n.6 (N.D. 11M. 1978), affldmem., 588 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1978), holding that
the absence of such a "reasonable apprehension" allegation in the complaint was a factor to be
considered in evaluating the existence of jurisdiction. 623 F.2d at 1211.
81. 623 F.2d at 1212.
82. 417 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1064 (1970).
83. 623 F.2d at 1212. International Harvester also relied upon Sticker Indus. Supply Corp. v.
Blaw-Knox Co., 367 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1966). Blaw-Knox informed customers of Sticker that
Blaw-Knox had been issued a patent and that licenses were available. Sticker established that it
lost sales because potential customers were fearful of infringement suits. And, in an earlier letter,
Blaw-Knox advised Sticker that the installation would infringe the Blaw-Knox patent. This case
was distinguished because in the present suit there was no contact between Deere and Interna-
tional Harvester customers, International Harvester did not allege a loss of past or potential future
sales, and Deere did not explicitly state that there might be infringement. 623 F.2d at 1213.
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part.84 The court explained that holding otherwise would "result in a
requirement that a patentee grant clearance to a competitor's designs
upon request or, by its refusal to do so, create declaratory judgment
jurisdiction. ' 85 With respect to Deere's alleged statement that it would
permit International Harvester to produce the CX-41 upon payment of
money, the Seventh Circuit gave it little weight because it did not men-
tion royalties, infringement or the Deere patent.8 6
The Seventh Circuit also held that International Harvester had
failed to meet the second portion of the declaratory judgment test by
finding that it had no immediate intent to manufacture the potentially
infringing product. Acknowledging that a declaratory judgment plain-
tiff need not have engaged in actual manufacture, 87 the Seventh Circuit
quoted Wembl,, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc.8 8 for the proposition that
where there is no actual manufacture, use or sale, and no immediate
intention and ability to practice the invention, there is no justiciable
controversy.8 9
Although International Harvester did not allege either immediate
intent or ability to manufacture the invention, it argued that such intent
and ability were evident in the pre-production preparatory steps out-
lined in its complaint. 90 Thus, the Seventh Circuit examined the evi-
dence presented and concluded that the design presently before them
might not be the design ultimately produced or marketed.9' Specifi-
cally, as of the date the declaratory judgment complaint was filed, a
complete CX-41 had not been field-tested, a necessary full season test
had yet to be conducted, no production CX-41's had been built, no
production parts had been made, no descriptions of the CX-41 had
been provided to customers or dealers, no orders had been solicited, no
operating manuals or advertising materials had been compiled and
tooling was in its early stages.92 International Harvester alleged that
84. 623 F.2d at 1213.
85. Id. In a footnote, the Seventh Circuit noted that in every case where an actual contro-
versy was found, the patentee was the first to raise the question of possible infringement. In the
two cases where the potential infringer initiated contact, it was held that no controversy existed.
Id. at 1213 n.7.
86. Id at 1213.
87. Id. at 1215. Eg., Super Prods. Corp. v. DP Way Corp., 546 F.2d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 1976).
88. 315 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1963).
89. 623 F.2d at 1215 (quoting Wembly, Inc. v. Superba Cravats Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.
1963)). The Seventh Circuit also cited Super Prods. Corp. v. DP Way Corp., 546 F.2d 748, 754
(7th Cir. 1976) and Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 439 F.2d 871, 875 (1st
Cir. 1971).
90. 623 F.2d at 1215.
91. Id. at 1216.
92. Id. These circumstances were distinguished from those in Super Prods. Corp. v. DP Way
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the CX-41 design was finalized insofar as it related to Deere's patent,
but the Seventh Circuit, in view of the significant lack of testing, was
not assured.93 Thus, the Seventh Circuit ruled that when International
Harvester's preparations had reached a "later" stage, and the other
juridictional requisites were present, it could file suit again.
The Seventh Circuit found still a third independent basis upon
which to support its decision that no declaratory judgment jurisdiction
existed. It pointed out that declaratory judgment jurisdiction is discre-
tionary, even where a justiciable controversy exists.94 Since the issue of
the patent's validity remained open in the pending suit, the declaratory
judgment might become unnecessary, and the court felt that this possi-
bility was an appropriate basis to decline to exercise declaratory judg-
ment jurisdiction.95
Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction and Post-Challenge Royalties
Precision Shooting Equipment Co. v. Allen
In Precision Shooting Equipment Co. v. Allen,96 the Seventh Circuit
sided with the Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits 97 by preventing a pat-
entee from terminating a license during the pendency of a declaratory
judgment action challenging the patent's validity as long as the licensee
pays post-challenge royalties into the court's escrow account. The li-
censee was also permitted to continue marking its product with the
number of the challenged patent.
Two issues were before the Seventh Circuit. The patentee first as-
serted that there was no declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Noting that
a valid license is an absolute defense to a patent infringement action,
the patentee argued that thus, there was no "actual controversy" and
that the plaintiff, the licensee, did not have a reasonable apprehension
of defending an infringement suit.98 The licensee countered that,
Corp., 546 F.2d 748, 752, 754-55 (7th Cir. 1976), where product testing had been completed and
manufacturing had begun. 623 F.2d at 1216.
93. 623 F.2d at 1216.
94. Id. at 1217. Eg., TRW v. Ellipse Corp., 495 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1974); Broadview
Chemical Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 417 F.2d 998, 1000-01 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1064
(1974).
95. 623 F.2d at 1218.
96. 646 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1981) (Wood, J. with Cudahy & Campell, JJ.), af'g 492 F. Supp.
79 (C.D. 11. 1980) (Baker, J.).
97. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 567 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1977); St.
Regis Paper Co. v. Royal Indus., 552 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1977); Atlas Chemical Indus., Inc. v.
Moraine Prods., 509 F.2d I (6th Cir. 1974).
98. Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976) is expressly limited to "actual controversies."
See text accompanying notes 72-77 supra.
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notwithstanding the license, a valid controversy existed.99 It also ar-
gued that jurisdiction should be accepted based upon the policy state-
ments in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,100 favoring the free use of ideas in the
public domain by permitting licensees to defend a patent infringement
action by challenging the patent's validity.' 0 '
The Seventh Circuit framed the issue as follows:
It must be remembered that the issue to be determined in the present
case is whether an "actual controversy" exists while the license is still
in use, diversity or no diversity. In general a "controversy" is more
than just a disagreement. It must be justiciable. A court will not
render advisory opinions or expound on academic or moot questions
merely to satisfy the curiosity of the parties. "The controversy must
be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties hav-
ing adverse legal interests" susceptible to specific relief. 0 2
The Seventh Circuit then held that a sufficient controversy had
been alleged to meet the constitutional standard. 0 3 One basis for its
decision was the rationale of Public Service Commission of Utah v.
Wycoff Co. 104 The court of appeals reasoned:
A court must be able to see the legal issue to be decided, the effect its
decision will have on the parties and that some useful purpose can be
achieved.
The legal issue [in this case] is the validity of the patent. The
decision will impact upon the business dealings between the parties.
The useful purpose served is to bring the contest to an end between
the parties and in the spirit of Lear to test out whether or not the
patentee is entitled to the monopoly and royalties it claims or
whether what it seeks to protect for itself is really part of the public
domain.' 05
A second basis was the finding that the licensee suffered a reasonable
apprehension of an infringement suit, based upon the complaint allega-
tions. The complaint alleged that the patentee was involved in an in-
fringement suit with another licensee and that a similar suit involving
plaintiff could reasonably be expected. 0 6
99. 646 F.2d at 315.
100. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
101. Id. at 670.
102. 646 F.2d at 316 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937);
Winsor v. Daumit, 185 F.2d 41, 43 (7th Cit. 1950)).
103. 646 F.2d at 317.
104. 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
105. 646 F.2d at 318 (citation omitted). Earlier in the opinion, the Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that Lear conferred no new jurisdiction on the federal courts, but that its rationale had
some influence on whether an actual controversy existed. Id. at 317.
106. 646 F.2d at 318. The court of appeals quoted from the licensee's complaint:
6. On information and belief, the defendants [patentee] have initiated lawsuits in
several jurisdictions alleging, interahla, infringement of U.S. Patent 3,486,495 on the part
of other manufacturers of "compound bows". On the basis of its allegations contained
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The Seventh Circuit also discussed its earlier decision in Beckman
Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Developments Corp. 0 7 It held that Beck-
man was not controlling because that case did not hold that license
termination is a precondition to a declaratory judgment challenge of
validity by a licensee. There, the court noted that the licensee had
failed to allege that it had intended to terminate its royalty payments so
that there had been no actual controversy with respect to the termina-
tion of the license agreement.' 08
As for the second issue on appeal, the patentee asserted that the
licensee was not entitled to the protection of the patent and to the privi-
lege of marking his product with the patent number while temporarily
withholding royalties from the patentee and paying them into an es-
crow account. The court of appeals considered several different alter-
natives and held that the escrow arrangement was "a practical and
sensible temporary solution. . . ...09 The patentee relied upon Kraly
v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp.I 0 in asserting that it was enti-
tled to all post-challenge royalties while the licensee continued to mark
its product with a patent notice. However, the Seventh Circuit deemed
this entitlement an open question."' The court declined to accept the
patentee's position because it would require the licensee to prejudge
validity, to stop marking and paying royalties and to breach the licens-
ing agreement. Since this position would create the risk of an infringe-
ment suit or of a termination of the license, the court felt it was too
herein that U.S. Patent 3,486,495 is invalid and unenforceable, BAC [licensee] has ceased
paying royalties under the aforesaid license agreements directly to defendant Allen
Archery, Inc., and instead is seeking leave to pay royalties due under the existing agree-
ment into this Court. Upon information and belief, defendant Allen Archery, Inc. has
sued or counterclaimed against at least one other licensee who has ceased paying royal-
ties and/or has sought leave to pay royalties into Court. BAC therefore has more than a
reasonable apprehension that it too will be sued for infringement of the foregoing patent
and that defendants will seek to terminate its license agreement and will also seek an
innction to disrupt BAC's commerce in "compound bows" and to attempt to prohibit it
om the manufacture, use and sale thereof.
7. An actual controversy exists between BAC and defendants concerning the va-
lidity and enforceability of U.S. patent 3,486,495 and declaratory relief is therefore nec-
essary and proper.
Id. at 318 n.9. See 869 OFFICIAL GAz. PAT. OFF. 1470 (1969).
107. 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cit. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971). In Beckman, the exclusive
sublicensee of a patent sued the patent's licensee, challenging the validity of the patent. The
Seventh Circuit held, iter alia, that the exclusive sublicense agreement did not preclude the subli-
censee from challenging the patent's validity. Id.
108. 646 F.2d at 317.
109. Id. at 318.
110. 502 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1974).
111. 646 F.2d at 319 (citing U.S.M. Corp. v. Standard Pressed Steel Co., 524 F.2d 1097 (7th
Ci. 1975)).
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risky for the licensee and contrary to the teachings of Lear. " 2
The licensee also urged that in the event of invalidity, it should be
entitled to a refund of all royalties paid under the license, and not just
the post-challenge royalties. The court of appeals rejected this claim on
the ground that such a refund would not stimulate an early validity test
as suggested by Lear. "13
Another alternative the Seventh Circuit considered was to permit
the licensee to withhold or recoup all royalties accrued or paid only
after a final judgment of invalidity. This alternative was also rejected
by the court because, if the patent were held invalid, the licensee would
have paid royalties for nothing of value, and the patentee would be
encouraged to delay the case. In addition, the court of appeals stated
that Lear provided "no reason for continuing royalty payments" dur-
ing a validity challenge." 4
In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Under the challenge approach adopted by the district court, all
the post-challenge royalties are safely in escrow for whomever may
be found to be entitled to them. It appears delay in resolution of the
controversy favors neither party. Nor is either party made to assume
risks not necessary to the resolution of validity. We adopt that
approach.115
Res Judicata Effect of a Prior Consent Judgment
American Equipment Corp. v. Wikomi Manufacturing Co.
In American Equipment Corp. v. Wikomi Manufacturing Co.,11 6 the
Seventh Circuit held that a prior consent judgment adjudicating in-
fringement as well as validity bars a party to the judgment or one of its
privies from subsequently contesting the validity of the patent.
In an action filed in 1971, American charged Wikomi I with in-
fringement of a patent for a concrete mixer. The action continued
through discovery and a pretrial conference, but it was terminated
short of trial through an order and consent judgment providing that the
patent was valid and infringed and enjoining further infringement., "i
Subsequently, Wikomi II, another corporation in privity with
112. 646 F.2d at 320-21.
113. Id at 320.
114. Id at 321.
115. Id. For other cases taking this same approach to the treatment of post-challenge royal-
ties, see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 567 F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1977); St.
Regis Paper Co. v. Royal Indus., 552 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1977); Atlas Chemical Indus., Inc. v.
Moraine Prods., 509 F.2d I (6th Cir. 1974).
116. 630 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1980) (Cudahy, J. with Sprecher & Bauer, JJ.).
117. Id. at 545.
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Wikomi I, manufactured without alteration the mixer that was the sub-
ject of the earlier consent judgment. American brought another action
for patent infringement and after extensive discovery moved for sum-
mary judgment that Wikomi II was barred from contesting either in-
fringement or validity due to the earlier judgment." 8 The district
court' 1 9 denied American's motion on the ground that the public inter-
est in the finality ofjudgments was outweighed by the public interest in
having licensees challenge the validity of patents as set forth in Lear v.
A dkinS.120
Prior to the Lear decision, the Seventh Circuit had not hesitated to
accord full resjudicata effect to consent decrees finding the patent in
question to be both valid and infringed.' 2' Joining with the Second,
Sixth, Eighth and Ninth circuits, and several commentators' 22 the Sev-
enth Circuit determined that this policy need not be changed due to the
Lear decision. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, first, it would foster
"earlier and more vigorous challenges" to the validity of patents, thus
facilitating access by the public to ideas and inventions that rightfully
belong.to it. Secondly, "the strong interest in voiding meritless patents
will be adequately protected" because the policy does not foreclose va-
lidity challenges except for parties to the consent decree and their priv-
ies. Third, it would eliminate ad hoc or case-by-case determinations of
whether the resjudicata doctrine applied to a consent decree adjudging
both validity and infringement. 23 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court's denial of summary judgment.
The court of appeals also addressed Butterfeld v. Oculus Contact
Lens Co.,124 cited by Wikomi as permitting a defendant to subse-
quently contest validity even though it had entered into a consent de-
cree admitting both validity and infringement. The court
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). See text accompanying note 100 supra.
121. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 408 F.2d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1969); Kiwi
Coders Corp. v. Acro Tool & Die Works, 250 F.2d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 1957).
122. See Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 532 F.2d 846, 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 976 (1976); Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. U.S.M. Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 780-81 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976); Broadview Chemical Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474 F.2d 1391, 1394-95
(2d Cir. 1973); A.W. Schnitger v. Canoga Elec. Corp., 462 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam);
United States ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Barco Corp., 430 F.2d 998, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 1970); U.S.M.
Corp. v. Standard Pressed Steel Co., 453 F. Supp. 743, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Langsam, Res Judicata
Effects of Consent Judgments in Patent Infringement Litigation, 36 FED. B.J. 171, 183-84 (1977);
Note, "To Bind or Not to Bind": Bar and Merger Treatment of Consent Decrees in Patent Infringe-
ment Litigation, 74 CoL. L. REV. 1322, 1347-50 (1974).
123. 630 F.2d at 548-49.
124. 332 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aj'd mem., 177 U.S.P.Q. 33 (7th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam).
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acknowledged that Buttef/eld might support Wikomi's position, but
stated that any earlier decisions must yield to its present ruling. 25
It is noteworthy that the Seventh Circuit's decision in American
did not consider the situation where a defendant admitted validity and
infringement under an earlier consent decree, subsequently took a li-
cense, and then sought to challenge the validity of the patent under the
doctrine of Lear. Whether such a defendant will be barred from chal-
lenging the validity of the patent by resjudicata as a result of the prior
consent judgment remains an open question.
Attorneys' Fees
Scheller-Globe Corp. v. Milsco Manufacturing Co.
In Scheller-Globe Corp. v. Milsco Manufacturing Co., 126 the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed with very little discussion a finding of patent in-
validity under sections 102 and 103 for two patents, but reversed the
allowance of attorneys' fees to defendants due to a lack of clear and
definite proof of willful misconduct by the plaintiff.127
The Seventh Circuit criticized the district court's substantially ver-
batim adoption of findings of fact and conclusions of law tendered by
the defendants because they were more an "advocate's partisan brief'
than objective findings and conclusions. 28 However, recognizing that
this practice can be of considerable assistance to a trial judge, the court
of appeals did not disturb its earlier holding that left such an adoption
to the discretion of the trial judge. 29 Ultimately, portions of the lower
court's findings of fact were adopted by the Seventh Circuit:
[W]e are satisfied that the district court's findings of fact directed to
the validity of the patents under [sections] 102 and 103 met the clas-
sic definitional basis of U.S. v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948),
and we are not on the entire evidence, left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake was committed with respect to these
findings. 130
125. 630 F.2d at 547 n.3.
126. 636 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1980) (Pell, J. with Swygert, J. & Wisdom, J. sitting by designation
from the Fifth Circuit).
127. The district court opinion is reported at 206 U.S.P.Q. 42 (E.D. Wis. 1979). Both patents
related to processes for manufacturing integral skin urethane form products. United States Patent
No. 3,099,516, entitled "Method of Molding a Form Plastic Having Skins on Selected Surface
Portions," 792 OFFICIAL GAz. PAT. OFF. 1207 (1963); United States Patent No. 3,523,918, entitled
"Method of Fabrication of Molded Parts of Polyurethane Foam Having a Noncellular Surface
Layer," 877 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 392 (1970).
128. 636 F.2d at 178.
129. Id. See Reese v. Elkhart Welding & Boiler Works, Inc., 447 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir.
1971).
130. 636 F.2d at 178-79. Except for the issue of attorneys' fees, the other findings and conclu-
sions were neither adopted nor reversed.
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With respect to attorneys' fees, the district court had concluded
that the case was exceptional and that an award of attorneys' fees was
warranted,' 3' relying upon Skil Corp. v. Lucerne Products, Inc. 132 and
L.F Strassheim Co. v. Gold Medal Folding Furniture Co. 133 However,
the Seventh Circuit overruled the district court's award, referring to its
earlier opinion in Super Products Corp. v. DP Way Corp.' 34 and its re-
quirement that "the misconduct must be accompanied by some element
of willfulness or bad faith and that entitlement to an award of attor-
neys' fees required clear and definite proof."' 35 The Strassheim and
Skil cases were noted as being in accord with the Super Products case,
but the Seventh Circuit concluded that in the present case the requisite
willfulness had not been shown by clear and definite proof.' 36
In Strassheim, the court noted that the patent owner was in posses-
sion of documents which clearly invalidated its patent. These docu-
ments were neither called to the attention of the Patent and Trademark
Office nor produced in response to discovery requests, but they ulti-
mately came to light during the second trial. 37 In Skil, the court found
that certain trial testimony "amounted to an unconscionable act done
with deceptive intent."' 38
With respect to the present case, the Seventh Circuit reviewed and
discounted evidence purportedly proving that the plaintiff filed suit in
bad faith and continued to litigate knowing that its patents were inva-
lid. An invalidity opinion by a supposedly neutral witness was in fact
by someone with an interest adverse to that of the patentee. The plain-
tiers response to an independent opinion evaluating the effect of for-
eign prior art under section 119 was not deemed to be frivolous or
unrealistic. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit referred to a letter from
the plaintiffs counsel that demonstrated openness and candor with op-
posing counsel. Concluding that the requisite bad faith showing had
not been made, the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling. 139
131. Id. at 179.
132. 503 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975).
133. 477 F.2d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 1973).
134. 546 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1976).
135. Id. at 757-58.
136. 636 F.2d at 179.
137. 477 F.2d at 821-23.
138. 503 F.2d at 750.
139. 636 F.2d at 180-81.
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Dischargeability in Bankruptcy of Patent Infringement
In re The Magnavox Co.
In In re The Magnavox Co., 140 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision that, because a claim of patent infringement is a
tort and, therefore, not provable in bankruptcy under the old Bank-
ruptcy Act,14 1 it is, thus, is not dischargeable under a plan of
arrangement.
On June 6, 1977, Universal Research Laboratories, Inc. (Univer-
sal) filed a petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act and a plan
of arrangement was confirmed on August 22, 1977. Thus, Universal
was released from its dischargeable debts and all creditors whose debts
were discharged were enjoined from enforcing their claims. 142
The Magnavox Company was the exclusive licensee of Sanders
Associates, Inc. for patents relating to home video games. 43
Magnavox received no official notice of the chapter 11 proceeding and
did not file a claim against Universal. Magnavox knew of the order
enjoining creditors from enforcing their claims, but nevertheless fied a
complaint charging infringement on August 25, 1977. Universal set
forth its discharge in bankruptcy as an affirmative defense. '4
The bankruptcy court ruled that Magnavox's claim against Uni-
versal was provable and dischargeable and ordered Magnavox to with-
draw its claims for pre-petition infringement. However, the
bankruptcy court did permit Magnavox to withdraw its suit pending
appeal of the order. 45 On appeal, the district court reversed the bank-
ruptcy court ruling that a claim for patent infringement is a tort and
therefore not provable in bankruptcy. Moreover, it further held that
even if provable, the claim was not dischargeable because Magnavox
alleged a willful and malicious injury. 4" The Seventh Circuit upheld
this ruling and discussed the exceptions to dischargeability of claims.
The court of appeals observed that section 63 of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 t47 defined several classes of claims which may be proven
140. 627 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1980) (Bauer, J. with Sprecher & Cudahy, JJ.).
141. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1-1255 (1976)) (repealed 1979).
142. 627 F.2d at 804. See 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976) (repealed 1979).
143. United States Patent No. 3,659,284, entitled "Television Gaming Apparatus," 897 OFFI-
ctAL GAz. PAT. OFF. 1485 (1972), and United States Reissue Patent No. 28,507, 937 OFFICIAL
GAZ. PAT. OFF. 214 (1975).
144. 627 F.2d at 804.
145. Id See In re Universal Research Laboratories, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. 984 (N.D. I11. 1978)
(opinion of the bankruptcy court).
-l 6. 627 F.2d at 804.
147. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976) (repealed 1979).
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and discharged by a plan of arrangement. However, the court noted
that tort claims are not provided for in the Act and thus are not prov-
able.' 48 Since patent infringement is generally considered to be a
tort,149 the Seventh Circuit commented that the question of provability
appeared simple. However, the court noted the following United States
Supreme Court dicta: "[WIhere, by means of the tort, the tort feaser
obtains something of value for which an equivalent price ought to be
paid, even if the tort as such be forgiven, there may be a provable claim
quasi ex contraclu." 50 This language gave rise to a class of claims
provable in bankruptcy as quasi-contract. And, since provable claims
include those founded upon "an open account, or a contract expressed
or implied,"' 5' Universal contended that a patent infringement claim
was contractual in nature and therefore discharged by its plan of
arrangement.
The Seventh Circuit disposed of this argument by first relying on
two district court cases to define the scope of a quasi-contractual rela-
tionship as
limited to certain types of actions such as embezzlement, breach of
trust, or fraud, where there is some quasi-fiduciary relationship be-
tween the wrongdoer and the injured party, or where there are at
least mutual dealings between them. In those situations the fiction of
a contract to restore profits is more palatable.' 5 2
With the scope so limited, the court of appeals then further stated:
[TIhere is nothing of a contractual character in the situation, nor has
the law ever resorted to the fiction of a contract on the part of the
infringer to pay over his profits to the patentee. . . . I take it there-
fore that when Congress in 1898 passed the Bankruptcy Act, there
was no intention to make an ordinary, noncontractual claim for pat-
ent infringement provable as a claim "founded upon . contract
express or implied."' 53
Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that a claim for patent infringement is a
tort as a matter of law and is thus not provable in bankruptcy and
cannot be enjoined by the order of the bankruptcy court. 54
148. 627 F.2d at 805 (citing Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239 (1920); 3A W. COLUER, BANK-
RUPTCY 1 63,25 (14th ed. 1975)).
149. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931).
150. Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239, 251 (1920).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(4) (1976) (repealed 1979).
152. 627 F.2d at 805 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. M.V.C. Distrib. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 980,
984 (E.D. Mich. 1979); In re Paramount Publix Corp., 8 F. Supp. 644, 645 (S.D. N.Y. 1934)).
153. 627 F.2d at 805 (citing In re Paramount Publix Corp., 8 F. Supp. 644, 646 (S.D. N.Y.
1934)).
154. 627 F.2d at 806-07. The Seventh Circuit explicitly decided not to follow the advice of its
earlier decision in Schiff v. Hammond Clock Co., 69 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1934), rev'das moot, 293
U.S. 529 (1934), stating that it carried no precedential weight. Id. at 806 n.6.
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COPYRIGHTS
Fo feiture of Copyright under the 1909 Act
Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.
In a case whose facts bridged two different copyright acts, Data
Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A4 Group, Inc., 5 5 the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the granting of defendant JS&A's motion for summary judgment of no
copyright infringement. This holding was based upon a finding, under
the 1909 Copyright Act,' 56 that plaintiff Data Cash's copyright had
been forfeited.
In 1976, Data Cash contracted with a third party to create a com-
puter program for a chess game. Once completed, the program was
stored in a silicon chip commonly known as a read-only memory
(ROM) and integrated into the plaintiffs game. Although the printed
copies of the program generated by the third party had a copyright
notice, there was no notice on the ROM, game board, packaging or
accompanying instructions. And, one who "read" the contents of the
ROM would not see a copyright notice because none was there. In
1977, Data Cash sold over 2,500 games to the public without any re-
strictions and continued its sales thereafter.'5 7
In June 1978, Data Cash became aware of the defendant's manu-
facture of a ROM for another chess game and discovered that it con-
tained the identical computer program. Thus, in late 1978 the plaintiff
filed suit for copyright infringement and unfair competition. 58
The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, stating that "since the ROM is not in a form which one can 'see
and read' with the naked eye, it is not a 'copy' within the meaning of
the 1909 Act."' 159 With respect to the 1976 Act, 160 the district court
stated that it "applies to computer programs in their flow chart, source
and assembly phases but not in their object phase, i.e., the ROM
... ,6. In other words, the source program was deemed a writing,
155. 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) (Nichols, J. sitting by designation from the United States
Court of Claims, with Swygert & Cummings, JJ.).
156. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1077 (1909) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
157. 628 F.2d at 1041.
158. Id. Proceedings on the unfair competition count were suspended pending resolution of
the copyright issues.
159. 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Il. 1979) (Flaum, J.). The district court relied on White-
Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), holding that a player piano roll was
not a "copy" of the musical composition it could play.
160. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
161. 480 F. Supp. at 1066 n.4.
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but the object phase-the ROM-was considered a "mechanical de-
vice" which could not qualify as copyrightable subject matter. 62 These
issues were neither briefed nor considered on appeal, and the Seventh
Circuit observed that neither party defended the district court's
positions. 163
The Seventh Circuit first addressed the threshold issue of whether
the 1909 or 1976 Copyright Act applied:
[I]f the program went into the public domain prior to January 1,
1978, no copyright protection would be afforded by the 1976 Act.
Furthermore, the determination as to whether a work entered the
public domain prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act must be
made according to the copyright law, common law and statutory, as
it existed prior to the 1976 Act. 64
It relied upon section 26 of the 1909 Act for a definition of the "date of
publication:" "the earliest date when copies of the first authorized edi-
tion were placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed by the proprietor
.... "165 Focusing upon the date that the plaintiff sacrificed control of
the work, rather than the date that the public actually viewed the work,
the Seventh Circuit held that the first publication was in 1977, making
the 1909 Act applicable. 66
Under the 1909 Act, publication without notice of the copyright
resulted in a forfeiture of the copyright, unless it occurred in a limited
publication. 167 Data Cash urged several bases for finding a limited
publication: that it did not know that the ROM could be copied; that it
took all reasonable steps to prevent duplication once it became aware
of the copying; and that JS&A was not misled by the absence of the
notice. Each of these arguments was respectively rejected by the court.
It stated that limited publication is a question of law and not intent,
that the attempts to prevent copying and to notify others were subse-
quent to entry into the public domain and that the absence of notice
was fatal whether or not anyone was misled. 68 As a result, the excep-
tion to waiver of limited publication was not available to Data Cash.
Finally, Data Cash alleged that the absence of notice was ex-
162. Id. at 1068.
163. 628 F.2d at 1041.
164. Id. (citing 1 M. NIMMER, ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[H] (1979)).
165. 628 F.2d at 1042 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (repealed 1977)). The Seventh Circuit also
cited Advisers, Inc. v. Wiessen-Hart, Inc., 238 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1956), cer. denied, 353 U.S. 949
(1957).
166. 628 F.2d at 1042.
167. Id See 1 M. NIMMER, ON COPYRIGHT §§ 4.13[A], 714[A] (1979).
168. 628 F.2d at 1043.
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cused, 169 relying on section 21 of the 1909 Act:
Where the copyright proprietor has sought to comply with the provi-
sions of this title with respect to notice, the omission by accident or
mistake of the prescribed notice from a particular copy or copies
shall not invalidate the copyright.170
The Seventh Circuit disagreed on the basis that the notice was absent
from all public copies of the work, not merely from particular copies.
Also, the court noted that the plaintiff intentionally failed to comply
with the notice requirements, thinking that a copy of its chess program
could not be made from the ROM.' 71 Thus, the court held that any
copyright protection Data Cash might have had, was forfeited.
Because the case was decided under the 1909 Copyright Act,
neither the district court nor the court of appeals decision can be con-
sidered controlling on the issue of whether or not a ROM is subject to
copyright protection under the 1976 Act. For instance, 4he statutory
definition of "literary works" in the 1976 Act is broad eilough to in-
clude mechanical devices from which one cannot read with the naked
eye: "'Literary works' are works. expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature
of the material objects, such as. . .tapes, disks, or cards, in which they
are embodied."' 72 And section 102(a) of the 1976 Act states:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, now known or later developed, from which they can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device."'173
The House Committee Report confirms this broad scope of protection
by expressly including "computer data bases, and computer programs
." with no limitation on the means of embodiment or perception. 74
TRADEMARKS
Descrptiveness of a Service Mark
MBH Enterprises, Inc. v. WOKY Inc.
* The Seventh Circuit, in MBH Enterprises, Inc. v. WOKY Inc.,17 5
169. Id.
170. 17 U.S.C. § 21 (1976) (repealed 1977).
171. 628 F.2d at 1043-44.
172. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 111 1979).
173. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. III 1979).
174. H.R. Rep. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprimediq [19761 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5667.
175. 633 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1980) (Bauer, J. with Pell, J. & Crowley, J. sitting by designation
from the Northern District of Illinois).
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affirmed the district court's summary judgment that radio station
WOKY was entitled to indicate that it "loved" the city of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. The descriptiveness and good faith use of such slogans by
WOKY were found to support a fair use defense to the charge of in-
fringement of the service mark "I LOVE YOU."'1 76
MBH owns the federally registered radio entertainment service
mark "I LOVE YOU'1 and licensed its use to radio stations as part of
a multifaceted promotional campaign. Beginning in December 1976,
WISN, a Milwaukee licensee, began broadcasting the slogan "I Love
You Milwaukee," placed it on bus placards, used it as a theme for an
art contest and sponsored T-shirts and glassware displaying the
slogan. 178
In March 1979, WOKY began a campaign to tell Milwaukee of its
love. WOKY was aware of the MBH program and of the efforts of
WISN in Milwaukee, but on advice of counsel, persisted in stating that
it also loved Milwaukee. WOKY adapted three formulations bearing
some similarity to the MBH service mark. These were displayed on
billboards and bumper stickers and broadcast on television and radio:
"WOKY LOVES MILWAUKEE," "I LOVE MILWAUKEE" and, for
a disc jockey, "ROBB EDWARDS LOVES MILWAUKEE." Also, in
what was a prime factor in the Seventh Circuit's decision, all of these
formulations carried WOKY's call letters and prominently displayed
its frequency, Radio 92.179
MBH sued, charging trademark infringement. However, the dis-
trict court granted WOKY's motion for summary judgment, reasoning
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1976) provides in part:
(b) If the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable under section
1065 of this title, the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive
right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or
services specified in the affidavit filed under the provisions of said section 1065 subject to
any conditions or limitations stated therein except when one of the following defenses or
defects is established:
(4) That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is
a use, otherwise than as a trade or service mark, of the party's individual name in
his own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or
of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to
describe to users the goods or services of such party, or their geographic ongin
The Seventh Circuit stated that, technically, this defense applied only in actions based upon an
incontestable mark. But, it also stated that "[tihe statutory defense is but a restatement of the
common law defense, however, Venetiawaire Corp. v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1081 (2d
Cir. 1970), and is, by virtue of 15 U.S.C. § II15(a), available in this action." 633 F.2d at 52 n.2.
177. Registration No. 1,111,960, 978 OFFICtAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. (T.M.) 189 (1979).
178. 633 F.2d at 51.
179. Id. at 52, 55-56.
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that the infringement action was defeated by the absence of any genu-
ine issue of fact concerning WOKY's entitlement to a "fair use" de-
fense under section 1115(b)(4) of title 15 of the United States Code.18 0
Since the validity of the service mark was not at issue, the issues raised
on appeal consisted of determining whether the district court errone-
ously held that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to
three propositions: "First, that WOKY's slogans were not service
marks; second, that WOKY employed them in good faith merely to
describe its services; and, third, that the slogans were in fact descriptive
of WOKY's services."''
The Seventh Circuit first set out the definition of a service mark
and its function: "A service mark is a symbol or combination of sym-
bols used by a source of services to identify itself to the public as the
source of its services and to create in the public consciousness an
awareness of the uniqueness of the source and of its services."' 8 2 The
court explained that a trade or service mark functions as a vehicle for
the carriage of positive messages concerning the product or service
which it denotes. 8 3 Thus, a mark's purpose is to separate those goods
or services from others in the public consciousness, to identify them as
the product of a single source and to represent them in the mind of the
public. ' 8 4
With respect to the actual function of the WOKY slogans, the Sev-
enth Circuit stated that if they were descriptive, it was unlikely that
they could function as service marks. '8 5 Descriptive devices were char-
acterized by the court as "those that 'impart information directly' or are
necessary to the description of the goods or services in question."' 8 6
180. 633 F.2d at 52. For the statutory text, see note 175 supra.
181. 633 F.2d at 53.
182. Id at 53-54. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976) provides in part:
In the construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is plainly apparent from the
context-
The term 'service mark' means a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to
identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the services of others.
Titles, character names and other distinctive features of radio or television programs
may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may
advertise the goods of the sponsor.
See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380-81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 830 (1976).
183. 633 F.2d at 54.
184. Id.
185. Id. This statement was based upon the principle that a mark that is merely descriptive is
not registerable and is not protectable in the absence of secondary meaning. See Union Carbide
Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Westward
Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627, 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968).
186. 633 F.2d at 54 (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th
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Finding that the word "love" and its variants are not coined or fanciful,
the Seventh Circuit held that the WOKY slogans "clearly 'impart in-
formation directly,'" meaning that WOKY liked Milwaukee and the
slogans were thus descriptive. 8 7 This conclusion was further sup-
ported by the absence of any evidence that consumers were likely to
take the slogans for service marks or become confused concerning the
source of the services.18 8
WOKY was found to have used its slogans in good faith because it
identified itself by its call letters and frequency when using the slogans;
thus, the court of appeals determined that WOKY did not intend to
confuse the public. Its intent to derive commercial advantage did not
require a finding that WOKY intended to use the slogans as service
marks. 89
The Seventh Circuit thus agreed with the district court that no
genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to WOKY's fair use
defense.
CONCLUSION
It may be seen that the intellectual property decisions of the Sev-
enth Circuit during its 1980-81 term touched on a wide range of topics.
While some cases involved primarily factual questions, other cases set-
tled important legal issues in this area of federal law.
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976)). See A. SEIDEL, S. DALROFF & E. GONDA, TRADEMARK
LAW AND PRACTICE § 40.6 at 77 (1963).
187. 633 F.2d at 55. The Seventh Circuit cited the Oxford English Dictionary for the defini-
tion of the transitive verb "to love" having a thing as its object: "To have a strong liking for; to be
fond of; to be devoted or addicted to. In U.S. a frequent vulgarism for like." 633 F.2d at 55 n.6
(emphasis by the court).
188. 633 F.2d at 55.
189. Id.

